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Abstract 
 
Studies on the internal organization of the European Parliament (EP) have largely overlooked 
the impact of its inter-institutional context. Addressing the gap, this paper examines how the 
different inter-institutional balance of power under the consultation and codecision legislative 
procedures affects the intra-parliamentary allocation of consultation and codecision reports. 
The analysis of reports allocated during 2004-2007 shows that the higher competition for 
codecision reports left unchecked by the informal rules of report allocation has produced clear 
winners and losers. Disloyal party group members are ‘punished’ by group coordinators in the 
allocation of any reports. Furthermore, members of the centre-right party group coalition are 
privileged in the allocation of codecision reports, while legislators with outlying special 
interests and experts are given systematic access only to drafting consultation reports. Thus, 
the main mechanisms driving report allocation appear to be promoting party group cohesion 
and majority formation.  
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The allocation of resources and the assignment of parliamentary rights to 
individual legislators or to groups of legislators shape each of the following: 
the collective expression of policy objectives, the level of expertise that is 
embodied in legislation that seeks to meet legislative objectives, the 
effectiveness with which legislation is implemented, and, ultimately, the 
importance of the legislature in the governmental process. (Krehbiel, 1991: 2) 
The persistently growing legislative powers of the European Parliament (EP) with each treaty 
revision have made it increasingly important to understand its legislative organization. It 
affects the parliamentary ability to draft well-informed legislation, to build necessary 
majorities, to establish effective coordination with the other legislative institutions of the 
European Union (EU), and, ultimately, to assert its position in the legislative outcomes. A 
number of studies reviewed below have significantly advanced our knowledge of the EP 
structure. However, most of them have examined the internal parliamentary rules and 
division of resources in isolation from the external institutional environment in which the 
Parliament operates. In contrast, this paper aims at capturing the effect of the inter-
institutional locking on the internal EP organization. It examines how the different inter-
institutional legislative procedures defining the balance of power between the EP and the 
Council of Ministers shape the internal power struggle and division of tasks among 
parliamentary groups and individual actors.  
Specifically, the factors influencing the allocation of consultation and codecision reports are 
compared in lights of the substantively different distribution of power between the EP and the 
Council of Ministers under the consultation and codecision procedures as specified in the EU 
treaties. Drafting legislative reports on the Commission’s proposals by individual Members 
of the European Parliament (MEPs) constitutes probably the most influential individual 
legislative task within the EP. The rapporteurs serve de facto as the primary intra-institutional 
agenda-setters and the main parliamentary representatives in the inter-institutional 
negotiators. Thus, they can largely shape the content of adopted legislative acts. The choice 
of a rapporteur, therefore, can influence the level of expertise embodied in draft legislation, 
its representativeness of the preferences of the median member in the EP or bias toward 
certain interests outside the plenary, and the breadth of party group and plenary support it 
attracts. Nevertheless, it is not formally governed by the EP Rules of Procedure. Instead, 
informal procedures guide the division of reports among party groups. Furthermore, once a 
party group has won a report, its coordinator has nearly complete freedom in the final 
selection of an individual rapporteur. It is argued here that this procedural ambiguity can lead 
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to violations of the prevalent proportionality norm in the EP. Hence, the current system of 
report allocation and its consequences require due attention.  
While building upon the partisan (Cox and McCubbins, 1993), distributive (Shepsle, 1978), 
and informational (Krehbiel, 1991) theories of legislative organization, the hypotheses 
developed here regarding the factors shaping the allocation of consultation versus codecision 
reports do not strictly follow the congressional literature and instead are centred around the 
specific incentive structures of MEPs and party group coordinators given the EP rules and the 
EU inter-institutional procedures. Thus, it is expected that the informal character of the EP 
rules regarding reports allocation combined with the substantively higher powers of the 
Parliament under the codecision legislative procedure and, hence, higher competition for 
codecision than consultation reports, would lead to a bias in the division of parliamentary 
power in favour of certain groups and actors. Members of the bigger party groups, whose 
support is most often needed for adopting the EP position, would be advantaged in the 
allocation of codecision reports. Additionally, party group coordinators would reward loyal 
members with reports to promote group cohesion. However, they would avoid allocating 
codecision reports that are important for their groups to members with special interests and, 
hence, outlying policy preferences in certain areas. Thus, such ‘interested’ members are 
rather expected to concentrate on writing consultation reports. Finally, MEPs with 
educational and professional expertise, who could bring informational benefits to both the 
party group and the plenary, would be advantaged in the allocation of reports, especially 
consultation ones for which completion is lower. 
These hypotheses are examined with the use of an original data set on the legislative reports 
allocated during the first term of the 6th European Parliament (2004-2007), and data on the 
individual MEPs’ profiles (see Yordanova, 2009).  To give the reader a taste of the findings, 
the count models show that indeed the different parliamentary empowerment under the 
consultation and codecision procedures shapes the division of power within the EP. Thus, 
among the three biggest party groups generally forming the EP majority, the members of the 
Group of European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats (EPP-ED) 
and Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) appear to be 
privileged in the allocation of codecision reports. In line with the theoretical expectations, 
party group disloyalty decreases the number of any kind of reports a member is allocated. 
Furthermore, while there is no evidence of an effect of interest group affiliation or expertise 
4 
on the allocation of codecision reports, both factors increase the number of consultation 
reports that a legislator is allocated.   
In what follows, first, background information on the highly complex system of report 
allocation is provided, followed by a presentation of the academic literature on the topic. The 
hypotheses of the study are developed thereafter. Subsequently, the data and methods are 
described and the findings are outlined.  Finally, the theoretical and empirical contributions 
of the paper are discussed. 
The role of the rapporteur and the system of report allocation 
The legislative powers of the EP vary depending on the inter-institutional procedure required 
for adopting legislation falling in a specific policy area. Since the introduction of the 
codecision procedure in the Treaty of the European Union (1993), the extension of its 
application to ever more policy areas in the Amsterdam (1999) and Nice treaties (2003), and 
the virtual abolition of the cooperation procedure, the two main procedures used in adopting 
EU legislation have become consultation and codecision. The Parliament can only give its 
opinion under consultation procedure, while under codecision it has a veto power placing it 
on equal footing with the Council. The differential powers of the EP under the two 
procedures influence the level and type of external and internal pressures it attracts. The 
primary focus of such pressures is on the parliamentary legislative committees, which operate 
in open doors to the public and where most of the parliamentary deliberation takes place. The 
committees draft reports on the Commission proposals, in which they may propose 
amendments to the plenary to be considered in enacting the final EP position. However, there 
are substantial differences in the number and type of legislative reports that each committee 
writes depending on the policy area it covers.1 Some committees do not operate in policy 
areas falling under the codecision procedure as specified in the EU treaties. These differences 
in the legislative power among committees affect the competitiveness of their working 
environment, the leverage their members have in advancing special interests outside the EP, 
and the control national parties and party groups exerts on them. 
Within the responsible committee, usually one rapporteur is assigned to write each incoming 
draft report. The rapporteur is the primary legislator responsible for organizing discussions 
                                               
1
 In the examined period, about 90% of all ongoing codecision reports were drafted by nine committees (EP, 
2007a). 
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and hearings on a legislative proposal within the committee, proposing draft amendments and 
building majority support for the draft report. He or she has to present the committee draft 
report to the plenary upon the final committee vote and give an opinion on proposed changes 
to the committee draft report. The rapporteur also follows the report development through 
later readings, sits on the conciliation committee if one is formed (in the third reading of the 
codecision procedure), and, since recently, follows the legislative act in the implementation 
stage. In all these activities, he or she is expected to represent the committee common view 
rather than his or her own stance or that of his or her national party or party group. However, 
limited time resources put the rapporteur in a powerful ‘agenda-setting’ position. For 
instance, sometimes he or she would negotiate inter-institutional agreements with the 
representatives of the Commission and the Council in trilogue meetings without a clear 
committee mandate2. To control the development of reports, other party groups appoint 
shadow rapporteurs, who are normally invited in such meetings. However, usually only the 
representatives of the biggest party groups are present because the smaller ones often do not 
have the human resources to appoint shadow rapporteurs. Thus, recognizing the rapporteur’s 
substantive powers, interest group representatives and other lobbyists target mostly him or 
her in trying to influence the content of the legislative proposal.  
Despite the substantive role of rapporteurs, report allocation is not regulated by the EP Rules 
of Procedure (EP, 2007b). Instead, an unclear and complex set of rules guides it, which 
further differs among committees. First, party groups’ coordinators in a committee (selected 
by the respective groups’ committee members) compete for a report for their group. Second, 
once a coordinator has won a report for his or her group, he or she decides which member in 
his or her group gets to draft the report, i.e. the rapporteur. To describe the first step in more 
detail, party groups are allocated a number of points based on their size in the committee, 
with which their coordinators can bid for reports in closed-door coordinators’ meetings. The 
party group with the highest number of points gets to bid first, and if two or more groups are 
willing to pay the same price, the one with the higher remaining number of points gets the 
report (Corbett et al., 2005: 134). Prior to the bidding, a price may be set for a legislative 
report based on a common agreement of the party group coordinators, or alternatively there is 
a fixed price for reports based on their type, e.g. one point for own-initiative reports, two 
points for consultation reports, and three points for codecision reports in the Industry, 
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 A committee mandate is referred to as draft report that a committee adopts upon the first committee vote, 
including the committee amendments, if any. 
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Research and Energy Committee. This pricing suggests that there is a generally higher 
attractiveness of the codecision reports. A correcting penalty system may also be in place, 
where if a party group decides to skip its turn and not bid for a specific report, it is fined with 
one point (e.g. in the Industry, Research and Energy Committee). This is done to prevent the 
strategic behaviour of party groups saving points for popular reports- a strategy that smaller 
party groups may be willing to resort to in order to get priority over the majority party groups 
in obtaining some important for them upcoming report. If no party group wants a report, it 
may be allocated to the committee chair for no points as he or she usually serves as a 
rapporteur of last resort. Rapporteurs may also not be assigned in case the committee decides 
to consider a report without amendments under the procedure without amendments and 
debate (Rule 43.1, EP, 2007b).  
Due to its informal character and flexibility, the point system poses opportunities for 
disproportional representation in the report allocation of both party groups and national 
(party) delegations based on their sizes. This is further aggravated by the lack of transparency 
in the allocation process and lack of any external monitoring or enforcement of 
proportionality. When it comes to the division of reports among party groups, codecision 
reports are especially prone to disproportional allocation as they are the most expensive ones 
and, thus, difficult to obtain for smaller party groups, which may instead choose to spend 
their points on cheaper reports. Once a party group has won a report, the second step involves 
the party group coordinator deciding which full committee member or substitute within his or 
her group will be the rapporteur. There are no rules on how the coordinators should allocate 
reports. The lack of any formal rules assuring the proportional allocation of reports to 
national (party) delegations gives large manoeuvre to party group coordinators to 
accommodate individual legislators’ interests or use the allocations strategically (Yoshinaka 
et al., 2006: 8). Thus, it is an empirical question what factors trigger individual allocations, 
which several studies have addressed.  
Current state of the art 
Due to the substantive legislative role of rapporteurs, report allocation has attracted academic 
interest and has been examined in a number of studies. Some of them argue that the most 
important factor in report allocation are the special interests or interest group ties of MEPs 
(Kaeding, 2004, 2005), while others emphasize the role of their national party delegations 
(Hoyland, 2006), party groups (Benedetto, 2005), or the combination of the latter two 
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(Mamadouh and Raunio, 2002, 2003). However, despite the valuable insights these studies 
bring, their findings are not always reconcilable.  
Analysing reports allocation in the period 1999-2004, Kaeding (2004; 2005) concludes that it 
does not proportionally reflect the EP composition. Focusing on the Environment, Public 
Health and Food Safety Committee, he found that the ALDE, the Group of the 
Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) and the Confederal Group of the European 
United Left – Nordic Green Left (EUL/NGL) were overrepresented in the reports assignment, 
while EPP-ED and PSE (Socialist Group in the European Parliament) produced 10% fewer 
reports than expected from their sizes. He found variations also existed between countries, 
where Italy and France produced only a small amount of reports, while Sweden, Belgium and 
the Netherlands twice as much as expected. It appears that MEPs from environmentally 
oriented or Nordic member states are more active and dominate the committee. Thus, the 
distribution of reports in the Environment committee is not fully proportional to the national 
and ideological composition of the EP plenary. Kaeding (2005) provided descriptive  
statistics suggesting that this is the case also for the other committees. Considering all the 
reports allocated in the period 1994-2004, he showed that EPP-ED and PSE were on average 
considerably overrepresented, and when member states were considered - Germany and the 
Netherlands performed well above average. ‘The world of committee reports is one of 
disproportionality within party groups and national delegations that contradicts the overall 
principle laid down in the standing rules of procedure of the EP.’ (Kaeding, 2005: 99-100)  
In contrast, Benedetto (2005: 80) claims that with the exception of slight over-representation 
of EPP and PSE, the allocation of codecision reports in the periods 1996-1998 and 1999-2001 
was highly proportional to the party groups’ sizes. However, it was not so proportional to the 
national delegations’ sizes. On the one hand, this could be ascribed to the influential role 
played by the large national party delegations (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2002, 2003), which 
tend to be privileged in the report allocation. Mamadouh and Raunio (2003: 333; 2002) state 
that ‘national party delegations inside the transnational groups are often key gatekeepers in 
the division of spoils within the groups.’ They further specify that this holds true specifically 
for the constituent parties of the biggest party groups EPP-ED and PSE. On the other hand, 
Hoyland (2006) gives a different explanation for these discrepancies. He shows that MEPs 
from national parties represented in the Council are more active rapporteurs than other 
legislators in the codecision legislation. His analysis demonstrates that the number of reports 
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produced by governing parties is 43% higher than that by opposition parties. Along the same 
lines, Benedetto (2005) alludes to the significance of the privileged access of some MEPs to 
the Council and the Commission due to their national party affiliation.  
Thus, disagreements regarding the level of and causes for disproportionality of report 
allocation to party groups and national party delegations seem to be irresolvable when 
considering aggregate level data only. This has led scholars to turn to individual level 
explanations. Legislators’ individual interests and experiences could be the cause behind 
discrepancies. Benedetto (2005) has concluded that besides observing party proportionality, 
report allocation can by shaped by legislators’ self-selection and expertise. Similarly, 
Mamadouh and Raunio (2002; 2003) have acknowledged that ‘policy expertise is a major 
consideration’ when it comes to individual appointments (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003: 
344). More concrete evidence of the impact of individual level considerations has been given 
by Kaeding (2005), who found that experience at the European level has a strong positive 
impact on being allocated a report and so does affiliation with Greenpeace and other 
environmental group. The latter observation reflects the composition of the Environment 
committee of homogeneous high demanders often affiliated with green interest groups 
(Bowler and Farrell, 1995; Kaeding, 2005; Yordanova, 2009). Furthermore, in their study on 
report allocation in the Environment Committee, Yoshinaka et al (2006: 19) conclude that 
‘expertise, ideology, and views on European integration all affect the likelihood that an MEP 
will be a repeat rapporteur.’  
Additionally, patterns in the level of proportionality in report allocation could be detected 
when differentiating between the allocations of different types of reports. A first step in this 
direction is Hausemer’s study (2006: 254), which shows that MEPs from large national 
delegations, committee chairs and preference outliers obtain less salient reports than their 
party group colleagues, defining salience in terms of importance for own national party as 
reflected in party manifestos. He attributes the disproportionality to party group leaderships’ 
concern with maintaining the group cohesion via allocating to smaller national party 
delegations reports of high salience for them. Additionally, he holds that due to the open 
amendment rule in committee and plenary, MEPs who are not a part of the majority coalition 
(EPP-ED and ALDE) do not have incentives to compete for the most popular reports and, 
thus, focus on a restricted range of policy areas of particular interest to them. 
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While all these studies have greatly enhanced our understanding of report allocation, there is 
currently no common underlying pattern in their findings. This calls for a new comprehensive 
study on the allocation of different types of report examining simultaneously the predictions 
of alternative theoretical approaches in order to identify the conditions under which the 
certain factors shape report allocation. Is there a systematic difference in the allocation of 
codecision versus consultation reports? Is the allocation guided primarily by party groups’ 
considerations or individual preferences? More specifically, when do partisan affiliation, 
party group loyalty, expertise and interest groups ties play a role? All these questions are 
addressed by testing the theoretical predictions derived below in a model centred on the 
incentive structures of MEPs and party group coordinators, who are the ultimate report 
allocators.  
Theoretical predictions  
The parliamentary organization, i.e. its internal ‘allocation of resources and assignments of 
parliamentary rights to individual legislators or groups of legislators’ (Krehbiel, 1991: 2), 
shapes the EP ability to fully exercise its legislative power and advance its position in its 
negotiations with the Council. However, it is shaped in turn by the inter-institutional rules 
governing these negotiations. It is impossible to fully understand the pattern of division of 
power and resources in the Parliament in isolation from the inter-institutional context. Thus, 
for instance, the substantive legislative powers on the EP under the codecision procedure as 
opposed to the consultation procedure are expected to lead to accordingly higher level of 
internal competition for codecision reports. Therefore, the interrelation of the inter-
institutional context with the parliamentary rules and the incentives structure of individual 
actors has to be considered in formulating the theoretical expectations regarding individual 
report allocation.  
Research on the EP relies mostly on the theories developed in the context of the US 
Congress, which arguably present the only theoretical framework on legislative organization 
(see Longley and Davidson, 1998: 3). There are a large number of similarities between the 
Congress and the EP in that both legislatures operate in separated powers, bicameral 
institutional environment and have highly developed committee systems. However, the 
European Parliament functions in a unique multi-national, multi-partisan environment. One 
could argue that the US Congress operates in a similar multi-state environment where both 
local and national parties play a role and do not always have same interests. Nevertheless, 
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adaptation of the predictions of the congressional theories to the EP context is required and 
their explanatory power cannot be tested in a strict manner. Particularly interesting in the 
present study are the distributive (Shepsle, 1978), informational (Krehbiel, 1991) and partisan 
(Cox and McCubbins, 1993) rationales of legislative organization These are positive 
approaches assuming rational behaviour and endogenous institutional rules determining the 
distribution of legislative powers and hence shaping policy (Strøm, 1998). Their predictions 
are not exclusive bur rather complementary. While the system of rapporteurs originates in the 
continental parliamentary practice and does not exist in the US Congress (Corbett et al., 
2005), hypotheses about report allocation can nevertheless be informed following the logic of 
the congressional theories.  
The partisan rationale (Cox and McCubbins, 1993) prescribes that the majority party would 
dominate the work and output of committees while the minority party is neglected. However, 
as opposed to the US bi-partisan legislature, a plurality of national parties and European party 
groups are present in the EP and no single party group has ever held an absolute majority of 
the parliamentary seats. Thus, it could be expected that the prevalent majority coalition of 
party groups in the European Parliament would dominating the committees’ work and 
division of tasks instead. However, also no such permanent majority coalition exists in the EP 
as it does not need to elect a government like the national parliaments in the EU member 
states. Thus, legislative majorities have to be created on issue-by-issue basis. There have been 
two big party groups in the EP – the EPP-ED (formerly EPP) in the centre-right and PSE in 
the centre-left of the political spectrum, where EPP-ED holds more seats in the 6th EP term. 
The parliamentary absolute majority (i.e. half of all MEPs regardless of how many actually 
vote) required under the second reading of the codecision procedure is difficult to form 
without the assent of both groups. For a long time, grand coalitions between EPP-ED and 
PSE were common in adopting the EP position (Hix et al., 2007). However, only a simple 
majority (i.e. 50% of the voting MEPs only) is needed under the consultation procedure and 
in the first reading of the codecision procedure, in which cases other coalition patterns are 
more attractive when a grand coalition is difficult to secure. The simple majority rule is 
applied increasingly more often with 64% of all codecision dossiers during the first term of 
the 6th EP concluded in first reading (EP, 2007a). This puts in a powerful position the third 
biggest party group ALDE, which is a convenient coalition partner for each side in most 
policy areas being ideologically positioned between EPP-ED and PSE. Obtaining the backing 
of ALDE largely increases the independence of the larger party groups from the support of 
11 
smaller party groups. Thus, it is any configuration of the three biggest party groups EPP-ED, 
PSE and ALDE, which is most often required to form an EP majority. Hence, they can be 
expected to dominate the EP committees and the most important legislative tasks. The 
informal EP rules guiding report allocation, i.e. the ‘points system’, favour bigger party 
groups due to their ownership of most points for ‘purchasing’ reports, which gives them 
higher bargaining power and manoeuvre for strategic behaviour in the bidding for the popular 
reports. Thus, it could be expected that their members be privileged in the allocation of 
competitive reports, i.e. codecision reports. 
Hyp1 Membership in the three biggest European party groups- EPP-ED, PED and ALDE- 
increases the number of codecision reports allocated to a committee member or substitute 
Once the competition between party groups has been resolved, reports have to be allocated to 
individual legislators by group coordinators. This process is contingent upon the incentives of 
both individual MEPs and party group coordinators and, therefore, will be theorized below in 
view of these incentives. The selection or ‘self-selection’ of legislators may be influenced by 
multiple factors such as their partisan affiliation, partisan loyalty, legislators’ special interests 
and expertise. Furthermore, the individual incentive structures need not be the same for all 
MEPs. However, irrespective of whether legislators seek policy or career (Hix et al., 1999), 
drafting legislative reports can facilitate achieving their goals by increasing their visibility.  
Firstly, legislators who are primarily interested in further career in national or European 
politics depend on their national parties for re-election. Writing reports on matters of interest 
to their national parties and in accordance with the parties’ positions is one of the main ways 
in which MEPs can increase their ‘re-selection’ prospects. However, national parties are 
reportedly uninterested in the day-to-day operation of the EP and most of them would only 
try to ‘ensure higher level of responsiveness on committees that have legislative powers’ 
(Whitaker, 2005: 5, 2001). Furthermore, most of them have better way of influencing 
consultation legislation by addressing directly their respective national governments which sit 
in the Council of Ministers than by lobbying the EP. Thus, legislators interested in ‘pleasing’ 
their national party leaders would prefer writing codecision reports. Along the predictions of 
the partisan theory (Cox and McCubbins, 1993), party group coordinators would use this 
intense competition for reports, especially codecision ones, among career seeking MEPs as a 
means of enhancing group cohesion. Coordinators have been referred to as party group 
‘whip’ or ‘watchdogs’ within their committees, whose primary goal is achieving consensus of 
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the committee party group contingents around the same position (Settembri and Neuhold, 
2009: 141-2; Corbett et al., 2005). Thus, they are expected to reward loyal group members, 
i.e. members who tend to vote most often with the party groups’ median member, and punish 
disloyal members in allocating legislative reports. 
Hyp2 Party group disloyalty decreases the number of reports allocated to a committee 
member  
This is expected to hold true even more so for codecision reports, for which competition is 
keener.  
Hyp2a This effect is stronger in the allocation of codecision reports 
Secondly, other legislators who have specialized knowledge in particular fields may be 
attracted to writing reports falling within their area of expertise, or externally motivated to do 
so. The need for information could not be stressed more in the case of the EP, which has 
limited staff and, as opposed to national parliaments, does not elect a government on which it 
can rely for information regarding potential policy outcomes. Thus, it has the freedom but 
also the necessity to build its own expertise. Emphasizing the information accumulation role 
of committees in a setting of uncertainty due to the lack of a majority party, the informational 
theory (Krehbiel, 1991) predicts the plenary would create incentives for individual members 
to specialize. For instance, members who can specialize at low cost due to their educational 
and professional background would be assigned to respective specialized committees. Indeed, 
in the EP economists tend serve on the committees  Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Budgetary Affairs; lawyer are concentrated in the Committee of Legal Affairs and the 
Committee; members with previous experience the transport sector are mostly assigned to the 
Committee on Transport, etc. (Yordanova, 2009) Another incentive for specialization that the 
plenary can create is ‘the possibility of repeated appointments as rapporteur’ (Yoshinaka et 
al., 2006: 7-8), which is reflected in the flexibility of EP rules with respect to the proportional 
allocation of reports.   
A coordinator has an incentive to announce the names of the potential expert rapporteurs he 
or envisions at the stage of allocating the report between the party groups because: ‘If the 
suggested rapporteur is recognised as a specialist on the issue it is easier to get agreement on 
his or her nomination’ (Corbett et al., 2005: 134). Appointing a member with relevant 
expertise may facilitate the majority formation within the committee and plenary. It is 
costless for a party group coordinator to allocate to expert members consultation reports, for 
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which competition is generally low. Thus, experts are expected to write more consultation 
reports than other members. However, expertise is expected to be less of a determining factor 
in the allocation of codecision reports, for which not only inter-group, but also intra-group 
competition is stronger. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hyp3 Having committee-specific expertise increases the number of reports allocated to a 
committee member  
Hyp3a This effect is stronger in the allocation of consultation reports  
Finally, still other MEPs may be foremost policy-driven and seek policy that reflects their 
ideological convictions or the policy preferences of the interest groups they have been 
affiliated with. The distributive rationale (Shepsle, 1978) prescribes that committees serve 
special interests outside the legislative body, be those territorial interests or specific interest 
groups, on which their members depend for re-election. Interest groups can enhance MEPs’ 
re-elections chances by increasing their national party’s vote share (e.g. trade unions), or their 
future career prospects outside politics (e.g. industry and business groups). While their ties 
are likely also associated with some form of expertise, this expertise is linked to outlying 
ideological positions in the respective policy areas, which affect negatively their chances of 
obtaining popular reports.  
Being selected by the committee contingents of party groups, party group coordinators have 
the incentive to keep the majority of their group members satisfied with the rapporteur 
selection. Assuming that legislators with special interest tend to have ideal policy positions 
away from the group median on the respective legislative acts, coordinators would not select 
them as rapporteurs on important reports. Given the heterogeneous party groups’ membership 
of national delegations with sometimes differing interests, the selection of a rapporteur with 
median views in a respective area who can draft a report representing the views of most 
group members within the committee is essential for the intra-group majority formation. 
Thus, in the allocation of codecision reports where a lot is at stake, a group member with 
special interest group ties is unlikely to be selected irrespective of his or her expertise in the 
respective field.  
Hyp4a Having interest groups ties decreases the number of codecision reports a committee 
member is allocated 
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Nevertheless, interest groups’ primary lobbying point is the European Parliament due to their 
limited access to the Council of Ministers. Aiming at representing such groups, MEPs with 
respective interest group ties would be highly interested in drafting also consultation reports 
in the specific areas in order to voice their opinion and, thus, signal their support for the 
respective groups. The open amendment rule in committee and plenary provides further 
incentives for them to focus on reports of high salience for them but with lower common 
popularity. Depending on all party groups contingents within their committees for their 
position and re-selections, party group coordinators have an incentive not to exclude 
systematically any group member from writing reports, especially those that are single 
representatives of their national party delegation within the committees. Thus, to maintain 
group cohesion they would be willing to allocate to legislators with interest group ties 
consultation reports of special interest for them, but for which there is little general interest 
and competition (see Hausemer, 2006). 
Hyp4b Having interest groups ties increases the number of consultation reports a 
committee member is allocated 
Data, measures and methods 
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, the data and the sample are briefly presented. 
The data on the individual profiles of MEPs are collected from the EP web page and 
Eurosource (2005) (Yordanova, 2009), while the original data on the codecision reports are 
extracted from the Legislative Observatory site of the EP. The analyses cover report 
allocations made during the first semi-term of the 6th EP (22.07.2004 and 31.01.2007). Only 
substantive reports were considered, excluding reports considered under the simplified 
procedure without amendment or debate (Rule 43.1), codifications, technical reports meant to 
solely to formalize the new parliamentary powers in implementation due to entry into force of 
the new regulatory procedure with scrutiny, and reports only giving a parliamentary mandate 
to the Commission for the employment of new executives of the European agencies as for 
such reports a rapporteur is either not assigned or he or she plays minor technical role. All 
committees but those which produced no codecision or consultation reports are covered in the 
respective models. Thus, the analysis of codecision reports excludes the Constitutional 
Affairs and Petitions committees, while the analysis of consultation reports excludes the 
committees on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, Women Affairs and Petitions.  
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The unit of analysis required for to test the hypotheses of the impact of committee-specific 
expertise and interest-group ties is a committee full member or a substitute member. Since an 
MEP can serve on more than one committee, and most members are full members on one 
committee and substitutes one another, the data set on individual legislators has been stacked 
so that each observation in the restructured data  (legislator*committee) represents a 
committee member or substitute (see Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996, Ch. 20). While 
demographics and partisan variables stay constant, after stacking the other independent 
variables have been re-coded so as to reflect the nature of legislator-committee relationship. 
Since one and the same MEP can appear multiple times in the data, such observations have 
been weighted down to reflect the original number of cases in the data set with sampling 
weights (Long and Freese, 2003: 73).  
The two dependent variables represent the number of codecision or consultation reports 
assigned to a committee member or substitute. These are discrete interval variables ranging 
from 0 to 3, where 3 means an MEP has been allocated 3 or more reports of the respective 
type. As the assumption of normality of an ordinary least square regression is violated and the 
dependent variables are non-negative count, the usage of a count models is most appropriate. 
While the dependent variable measuring the number of allocated codecision reports is 
suitable for a simple poisson model, the overdispersion in the variable measuring the number 
of allocated consultation reports, reflected in its conditional variance being substantively 
higher than its conditional mean, calls for a negative binomial regression model (Long and 
Freese, 2003: 266-7). The latter model only adds an additional parameter to the poisson 
model to account for unobserved heterogeneity among observations and, thus, to correct the 
standard errors, which are otherwise biased downward. Hence, the two models have the same 
mean structure and their results are comparable.  
Dummies for membership in the three biggest European party groups – EPP-ED, PSE, and 
ALDE are introduced to test Hypothesis 1. In testing Hypothesis 2 and 2a on the impact of 
party group loyalty, the 1st dimension NOMINATE scores of MEPs are calculated via a 
multidimensional scaling technique (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997) using the roll call votes data 
collected by Hix, Noury and Roland (2007). These scores represent the relative proximity of 
legislators to one another based on their voting records and are used to calculate the absolute 
distance of MEPs from the median positions of their party groups. A small distance reflects a 
loyal voting record, while a high distance is a sign of a disloyal behaviour. While the roll call 
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votes are called only on a limited number of legislative acts, probably strategically so, and 
may not be representative of all votes (Carrubba et al., 2006), they are nevertheless the most 
suitable proxy for party group loyalty as it is the observable voting behaviour of legislators 
that party groups coordinators would be familiar with and base their allocation decisions 
upon. While party group coordinators are supposed to allocate reports proportionally to the 
national party delegations within their groups based on their size, this may not occur in 
reality. Thus, the size of a member’s national party delegation in the EP is controlled for. 
Furthermore, a variable accounting for the proportion of time that a member’s national party 
was in government during the examined period is included in order to address previous 
research suggesting that national parties in government write more codecision reports than 
opposition parties (Hoyland, 2006). This variable is calculated by dividing the number of 
months that a legislator’s party was in government by the total number of months in that 
examined period, i.e. thirty.  
In testing Hypothesis 3 and 3a, information on MEP’s educational and professional 
background is used to create a new ‘committee-specific expertise’ variable, signifying 
whether the expertise of a committee member is relevant for the respective committee on 
which he or she sits or is a substitute, coded as 1 if yes, and 0 otherwise. This variable is 
equal to one if a member fulfils the following conditions: has educational and professional 
experience in economic and sits on the Budgets Committee or the Committee of Economic 
and Monetary Affairs; has legal education or career and sits on the Committee of Legal 
Affairs or the Committee of Constitutional Affairs; has experience in international politics 
and sits (as a full member of substitute) on the Committee of Foreign Affairs; has natural 
sciences education and sits on the Committee of Industry, Research and Energy or the 
Committee of Environment, Public Health and Food Safety; has medical education and sits 
on the latter committees; or has professional expertise in the transport or telecommunication 
sectors and sits on the Committee of Transport and Tourism. Analogically, to test Hypotheses 
4a and 4b ‘committee-specific interest’ variable is created. It is a dummy variable assuming 
the value of 0 unless a member: has had farming ties recorded before the beginning of the 6th 
EP term and is on the Agriculture Committee; has had green group ties and is on the 
Committee of Environment, Public Health and Food Safety; has had trade union ties and is on 
the Committee of Employment and Social Affairs; has had industry of business ties and is on 
the Committee of Industry, Research and Energy or the Committee of Economic and 
Monetary Affairs; or has had ties to social groups dealing with people and is on the 
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Committee of Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. It has been shown elsewhere that 
members with such interest group ties have higher chances of assignment to the respective 
committees (Yordanova, 2009). Appendix A provides some descriptive statistics by party 
group on the variables constituting the committee-specific expertise and interest measures.  
Additionally, previous membership on the same committee in the last EP term is controlled 
for to take into consideration the impact of seniority. So is the number of reports allocated to 
a member, other than the ones measured in the respective dependent variable. Due to the 
crucial role that party group coordinators play in the allocation of reports, a dummy variable 
is included of whether a committee member is a coordinator or not. Similarly, the effect of 
being a committee chair is controlled for. All models include dummies for gender and age, as 
well as fixed effects for committee membership. The latter are included because substantial 
differences are expected between committees owing to the different number and types of 
report they allocated in the considered period and their differing sizes. To address further for 
the bias in the standard errors due to the group structure of the data, clustering by committee 
membership is added to the models to obtain robust standard errors and decrease the chances 
of committing type 1 errors (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000, Section 8.3).3  
Results 
The results of the count models are displayed in Table 1. The dependent variable in the first 
three models is the number of allocated codecision reports, while in the last three it is the 
number of allocated consultation reports to a full committee member or a substitute. The 
independent variables are introduced stepwise, testing first the unique effect of individual 
background, then the effect of party-related factors, and finally all effects simultaneously. 
The strength of each variable is represented in Table 2 by the factors changes it leads to in the 
number of allocated reports when it is increased respectively for dummy variables by one 
unit, or for the continuous ones by a standard deviation.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                               
3
 Size of member state was included in the preliminary data analysis but did not show to have a significant 
impact. 
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Partially confirming Hypothesis 1, the full model 3 on the allocation of codecision reports 
shows that after controlling for all other factors, being a member of either EPP-ED or ALDE 
increases of the number of codecision reports he or she is allocated. However, this is not the 
case for the members of PSE. Notably, the members of none of the three biggest party groups 
seem to be privileged in the allocation of consultation reports. The size of national party 
delegations is not a significant predictor in the full models of codecision and consultation 
report allocation. Thus, the results provide no evidence in support of Mamadouh and 
Raunio’s (2002; 2003) expectation that the members of bigger national party delegations are 
privileged in the report allocation. Nor does the proportion of time a member’s national party 
has been in government in the examined period seem to have an impact on the number of 
reports he or she receives. While admittedly based on individual rather than aggregate data, 
this finding fails to support the result of a previous study, which held that national parties 
present in the Council of Ministers write more reports than opposition parties (Hoyland, 
2006).  
The results provide strong evidence for Hypothesis 2. Party group disloyalty has a strong 
negative effect on the number of reports a member is allocated. However, there is no clear 
evidence that this effect is stronger for codecision reports as suggested by Hypothesis 2a. The 
analyses give mixed evidence regarding Hypothesis 3 and 3a. Committee-specific expertise 
appears to be unrelated to the number of codecision reports one is allocated. This may due to 
the fact that it is difficult for party group coordinators to justify systematically excluding non-
expert member from the writing of salient reports. However, relevant expertise is a positive 
predictor of the number of consultation reports a member is allocated. Due to the generally 
lower competition for consultation reports, it is easier for group coordinators to justify 
advantaging experts in the allocation of consultation reports. Having committee-specific 
interest groups does not have a significant negative effect on the number of allocated 
codecision reports, contrary to Hypothesis 4a. However, they have a significant and positive 
effect on the number of allocated consultation reports to a committee member or substitute in 
line with Hypothesis 4b. 
Among the control variable, being a committee substitute rather than regular member 
strongly decreases the number of any kind of reports one is allocated. Previous membership 
in the same committee in the past EP term seems to be a strong predictor of the number of 
codecision reports one is allocated, while it has no effect on the number of consultation 
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reports a legislator receives within a committee. Chairs seem be privileged in the allocation 
of consultation reports but not in the allocation of codecision reports. This is likely due to the 
fact that they serve as rapporteurs of last resort if nobody wants to write a report (Corbett et 
al., 2005). The opposite holds for party group coordinators, who are rather advantaged in the 
allocation, or self-allocation, of codecision reports owing to their powerful position. 
Interestingly, the numbers of codecision and consultation reports a member is allocated seem 
be correlated. The more codecision reports one writes, the more consultation ones he or she is 
allocated, and the other way round. In fact, 35% of the MEPs wrote all of the substantive 
codecision and consultation reports in the period. Finally, being a male member decreases the 
number of codecision reports one is allocated.  
Discussion 
The purpose of this paper is to improve our understanding of the legislative organization of 
the European Parliament. In particular, it examines how the intra-parliamentary division of 
power is affected by the substantively different legislative powers of the EP under the 
codecision and consultation procedures. Comparing the factors determining the allocation of 
codecision and consultation reports, the study has demonstrated that the internal 
parliamentary division of legislative tasks is shaped by the power-relations of the EP with the 
other EU legislative institutions. Combined with the informal rules of report allocation, the 
higher competition for codecision report as compared to consultation reports has produced 
clear winners and losers in the distribution of parliamentary power among individual 
legislators and party groups. 
Functional collective concerns about reaching parliamentary majorities combined with 
strategic entrepreneurial behaviour have led to a bias in the report allocation in favour of the 
members of EPP-ED and ALDE, whose support is sufficient for reaching the simple 
parliamentary majority increasingly applied in adopting legislation. These findings 
corroborate Hausemer’s (2006: 513) claim that ‘the distribution of salient reports mirrors 
coalition dynamics in the Parliament’. In the 4th and 5th EP grand coalitions were common, 
which is reflected in the past overrepresentation of EPP-ED and PSE in the report allocation 
(Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003; Kaeding, 2005; Benedetto, 2005). However, due to the 
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changes in the codecision procedure in the Amsterdam Treaty (1999)4 and the resulting 
drastic increase in the number of codecision acts concluded in first reading in recent years, 
the EP now needs less often to assure absolute majority support for legislation. Furthermore, 
since a centre-right majority holds both the EP and the Council since 2004, it has become 
easier for the EPP-ED to advance its positions with the Council under the codecision 
procedure even when it is not supported by PSE under qualified majority voting in the 
Council. Roll call vote analysis shows that the parliamentary coalitions are formed 
increasingly more often on left-right basis  (Hix et al., 2007). EPP-ED is better-off forming a 
centre-right coalition with the Liberals rather than a grand left-right coalition with PSE, in 
which it would have to make bigger policy concessions. Thus, it is plausible that EPP-ED 
prefers ALDE rather than PSE to get important reports. Logrolling between party group 
coordinators in the bidding for the most popular reports is possible given the informal 
characters of rules governing report allocation. Putting the members of the second biggest 
group PSE at a disadvantage in obtaining codecision reports violates the parliamentary norm 
of proportionality. Given the substantive ‘agenda-setting’ powers of the rapporteurs, 
underrepresentation in the report allocation of any party group can have important normative 
implications since actors who get to write the codecision reports have better chances of 
influencing legislation in a certain direction.  
While referring to the theoretical predictions of the congressional theories of legislative 
organization, the hypotheses here are centred around the incentive structure of individual 
MEPs and party group coordinators, who de facto decide on report allocations. The 
differential competition for codecision and consultation reports combined with the informal 
EP rules on report allocation, allowing for substantive manoeuvre in individual appointments, 
have strengthened the role of party group leadership. Group coordinators have seized the 
opportunity of controlling their members by using report allocations to discipline their 
members. It is the collective concern with furthering party group cohesion and policy 
preferences that drives the careful selection of loyal group members with non-outlying policy 
positions as rapporteurs for codecision reports, who can attract broader intra-group support. 
In contrast, members with portrayed special interests and outlying preferences in particular 
fields are given access only to writing consultation reports. These findings support 
                                               
4
 The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) abolished the Council’s ability of reinstating its common position if no 
compromise is reached with the Council after the third reading of the codecision procedure and introduced the 
option of early conclusion of codecision act already in first reading. 
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Hausemer’s (2006: 254) observation that preference outliers obtain less salient reports and 
corroborate Kaeding’s  (2005) findings of the positive impact of interest group ties on 
receiving reports, but only so long as consultation reports are concerned. Thus, party group 
coordinators choose rapporteurs strategically in anticipation of the receipt of reports in their 
groups and committees. Promoting party group consolidation and majority formation seem to 
be the major mechanisms driving report allocation, which comes closest to the predictions of 
the partisan theory. 
While contributing to our understanding the factors shaping the allocation of different type of 
reports, this paper covers only one semi-term of the EP. Thus, it is also advisable to examine 
previous and future periods in order to check the robustness of the current results over time, 
for which additional individual level data on past and future MEPs is needed. Further 
research on the resources available to individual legislators, such as number of assistants, 
party group and general staff, may be informative of the level of workload they have, and 
more specifically the number of legislative tasks they take aboard. A next step would be to 
examine how the rapporteur selection influences the procedural development and content of 
legislation.  
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Table 1 Count models of codecision and consultation report allocation 
 
  COD m1 COD m2 COD m3 CNS m1 CNS m2 CNS m3 
Committee-related 
interest group ties  .127  .144 .280**  .322** 
 (.150)  (.133) (.129)  (.157) 
Committee-related 
expertise .001  .048 .424*  .405* 
 (.184)  (.157) (.253)  (.232) 
Party group disloyalty  -3.270** -3.378**  -3.232** -2.541* 
  (1.274) (1.501)  (1.480) (1.323) 
EPP-ED  .531* .641**  .126 .237 
  (.272) (.291)  (.383) (.481) 
PSE  .225 .366  -.233 -.062 
  (.286) (.289)  (.449) (.517) 
ALDE  .596* .593**  .311 .219 
  (.310) (.283)  (.511) (.508) 
National party del. size  .014** -.002  .016** .011 
  (.007) (.008)  (.007) (.008) 
Time in government  .120 .092  -.164 -.080 
  (.169) (.137)  (.171) (.192) 
No. of codecision 
reports      .543*** 
      (.180) 
No. of consultation 
reports   .418***    
   (.096)    
Previously in committee   .878***   -.126 
   (.148)   (.250) 
Chair   .156   1.189*** 
   (.526)   (.396) 
Coordinator   .458**   .574 
   (.203)   (.383) 
Male -.480*** -.461*** -.360*** -.173 -.126 -.134 
 (.106) (.097) (.121) (.171) (.145) (.144) 
Age .006 .002 -.008 .016* .014 .011 
 (.008) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.009) (.010) 
Substitute -1.822*** -1.842*** -1.435*** -1.062*** -1.104*** -.750*** 
 (.292) (.283) (.262) (.238) (.240) (.241) 
DEVE .747*** .771*** .890*** -.695*** -1.077*** -.837*** 
 (.154) (.024) (.141) (.218) (.044) (.220) 
INTA .327** .287*** .425** .961*** .635*** .849*** 
 (.159) (.053) (.174) (.217) (.058) (.221) 
BUDG -.131 -.181*** -.176** .553*** .401*** .390*** 
 (.085) (.038) (.079) (.094) (.039) (.098) 
CONT .043 .154*** .176* .439*** .305*** .422*** 
 (.092) (.040) (.100) (.120) (.052) (.093) 
ECON 1.731*** 1.760*** 1.575*** 1.339*** 1.363*** 1.184*** 
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 (.049) (.031) (.108) (.101) (.036) (.152) 
EMPL 1.548*** 1.630*** 1.590*** .661*** .456*** .588** 
 (.125) (.016) (.123) (.229) (.041) (.235) 
ENVI 2.560*** 2.553*** 2.408*** .679*** .511*** .096 
 (.077) (.031) (.103) (.130) (.051) (.333) 
ITRE 1.400*** 1.367*** 1.435*** 1.137*** .993*** .999*** 
 (.074) (.033) (.092) (.142) (.034) (.169) 
IMCO 1.879*** 1.809*** 1.975***    
 (.161) (.048) (.131)    
TRAN 2.459*** 2.463*** 2.489*** .338** .158*** .081 
 (.120) (.029) (.131) (.146) (.016) (.188) 
REGI .163 .209*** .385*** -.632*** -.920*** -.627*** 
 (.156) (.027) (.142) (.219) (.018) (.211) 
AGRI -.738*** -.636*** -1.022*** 2.046*** 1.940*** 2.048*** 
 (.112) (.032) (.183) (.243) (.051) (.236) 
PECH .439*** .379*** -.202 2.894*** 2.537*** 2.784*** 
 (.157) (.026) (.220) (.218) (.053) (.210) 
CULT 1.949*** 1.950*** 2.086*** .165 -.176*** -.138 
 (.158) (.021) (.142) (.220) (.049) (.257) 
JURI 2.203*** 2.203*** 2.119*** 1.152*** 1.038*** .706*** 
 (.046) (.024) (.071) (.091) (.070) (.134) 
LIBE 2.174*** 2.152*** 1.752*** 2.942*** 2.595*** 2.548*** 
 (.134) (.022) (.223) (.223) (.058) (.244) 
AFCO    -.760*** -.917*** -.837*** 
    (.087) (.025) (.103) 
FEMM .426** .386*** .608***    
 (.177) (.081) (.155)    
Constant -3.034*** -3.254*** -3.178*** -3.775*** -3.339*** -3.744*** 
  (.491) (.516) (.561) (.514) (.488) (.749) 
Log-pseudolikelihood -243.0 -232.2 -217.3 -228.2 -221.8 -214.5 
McFadden pseudo R2 0.22 0.24 0.29  0.15  0.16 0.19 
Alpha     1.767  1.479  1.005 
lnalpha    0.570 0.391 0.005 
N 1547 1475 1475 1471 1399 1399 
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors displayed in brackets. 
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Table 1 Factor change in the expected count for a unit/standard deviation increase in x 
  CODm3 CNSm3 
Committee-related 
interest group ties  1.1546 1.3792 
Committee-related 
expertise 1.0494 1.4997 
Party group disloyalty 0.66 0.7282 
EPP-ED 1.8982 1.2671 
PSE 1.4418 0.9396 
ALDE 1.8092 1.2446 
National party del. size 0.9765 1.1161 
Time in government 1.0395 0.9669 
No. of codecision reports  1.2759 
No. of consultation 
reports 1.2344  
Previously in committee 2.407 0.8815 
Chair 1.1694 3.2835 
Coordinator 1.5816 1.7761 
Male 0.6979 0.8742 
Age 0.9219 1.1137 
Substitute 0.238 0.4723 
 
Notes: For the variables party group disloyalty, national party delegation size, time in government, No of 
codecision reports, No of consultation reports and Age the change in expected count for SD increase in X is shown 
(e^bStdX). For all other variables factor change in expected count for unit increase in X is displayed (e^b).
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Appendix A Committee-specific interest group ties and expertise of committee members and substitutes per party group 
  EPP-ED PSE ALDE 
GREEN/ 
EFA EUL/NGL IND-DEM UEN na committee 
Committee-specific interests          
Farming ties in AGRI 20 (32) 5 (21) 2 (4) 1 (4) 1 (3) 1 (6) 1 (4) 3 (7) 34 (81) 
Green ties in ENVI 10 (44) 4 (29) 0 (16) 8 (10) 1 (8) 0 (6) 1 (6) 0 (2) 24 (121) 
Trade union ties in EMPL 4 (29) 12 (30) 2 (12) 0 (5) 2 (8) 0 (2) 0 (2) 0 (4) 20 (92) 
Social groups in LIBE 3 (39) 7 (26) 2 (16) 2 (6) 1 (5) 0 (3) 1 (4) 0 (4) 16 (103) 
Industry/business group ties in ECON 15 (39) 7 (26) 7 (12) 1 (4) 0 (4) 2 (3) 2 (3) 0 (4) 34 (95) 
Industry/business group ties in ITRE 12 (38) 6 (29) 4 (12) 0 (6) 2 (6) 1 (1) 0 (3) 1 (4) 26 (99) 
Committee-specific expertise          
International relations experience in AFET 47 (59) 37 (43) 16 (18) 7 (9) 6 (10) 3 (9) 3 (8) 3 (5) 122 (161) 
Legal expertise in JURI 18 (21) 5 (12) 3 (6) 0 (4) 0 (2) 1 (1) 1 (2) 1 (2) 29 (50) 
Legal expertise in AFCO 15 (21) 6 (15) 3 (6) 0 (3) 1 (2) 0 (3) 1 (2) 2 (3) 28 (55) 
Medical education in ENVI 10 (44) 2 (29) 3 (16) 0 (10) 3 (8) 1 (6) 0 (6) 1 (2) 20 (121) 
Natural sciences and engineering educ. in ENVI 7 (44) 4 (29) 3 (16) 3 (10) 3 (8) 1 (6) 0 (6) 0 (2) 21 (121) 
Natural sciences and engineering educ. in ITRE 12 (38) 8 (29) 2 (12) 1 (6) 1 (6) 0 (1) 1 (3) 1 (4) 26 (99) 
Transport experience in TRAN 6 (35) 3 (27) 1 (12) 3 (6) 0 (6) 1 (6) 1 (4) 0 (5) 15 (101) 
Economics expertise in BUDG 15 (40) 9 (29) 4 (12) 0 (4) 1 (2) 2 (2) 1 (2) 1 (4) 33 (95) 
Economics expertise in CONT 8 (25) 4 (15) 4 (8) 1 (4) 1 (4) 2 (4) 1 (1) 0 (2) 21 (63) 
Economics expertise in ECON 20 (39) 12 (26) 5 (12) 1 (4) 1 (4) 3 (3) 1 (3) 2 (4) 45 (95) 
Note: The total number of members with respective column category with or without respective interests of expertise is displayed in brackets. 
Abbreviations: AFET: Foreign Affairs; DEVE: Development; INTA: International Trade; BUDG: Budgets; CONT: Budgetary Control; ECON: Economic and 
Monetary Affairs; EMPL: Employment and Social Affairs; ENVI: Environment, Public Health and Food Safety; ITRE: Industry, Research and Energy; IMCO: 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection; TRAN: Transport and Tourism; REGI: Regional Development; AGRI: Agriculture; PECH: Fisheries; CULT: Culture and 
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